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The composition of New Zealand public sector audit 
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Abstract  
 
This study investigates the association between the source of funding of New 
Zealand public sector entities (PSEs) and the composition of their audit committees.  
Fifty PSEs in the health, local government and tertiary sectors were examined and the 
results show that only 28 PSEs (56 percent) disclosed the existence of an audit 
committee in their annual reports. The size of the audit committees that exist are on 
average larger than that recommended by best practice guidelines; however most of 
the PSEs, with the exception of some of the education providers, do comply with 
guidelines recommended for audit committee independence and financial expertise. 
The study also finds that PSEs that have higher levels of debt are more likely to have 
independent audit committees; however PSEs that rely on high levels of government 
funding are not more likely than other PSEs to have an audit committee with a majority 
of independent members and a financial expert. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Stakeholders are taking a much closer look at organisations’ financial reports and 
practices, in both the private and public sectors. This is due in part to corporate scandals 
(such as HIH Insurance in Australia and Enron in the US) and the resultant Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX, 2002). More recently the finance and banking crisis, and frauds such as the multi-
million dollar public sector fraud at the Otago District Health Board in New Zealand have 
intensified corporate and public sector governance requirements and expectations.  
Stakeholders are paying more attention to the structures that are in place to ensure 
accountability and transparency of information, especially financial information. One of the 
structures that has become more common in recent times within public and private sector 
entities is the audit committee, which usually assists in monitoring the integrity and efficiency 
of an organisation’s internal controls, risk management, financial reporting and audit. 
In New Zealand there is no specific regulatory or legislative requirement for private or 
public sector entities (PSEs) to establish audit committees.  However a number of best 
practice guidelines for audit committees have been issued for the corporate sector. These 
include the New Zealand Securities Commission corporate governance principles and 
guidelines (NZSC, 2004) and the Institute of Directors’ best practice guide for directors which 
includes a section on audit committees (IOD, 2007). Most recently the Office of the Auditor 
General (OAG) issued a good practice guide for audit committees in the public sector (OAG, 
2008), 
New Zealand, in common with all developed countries, has a financially significant 
public sector and two of the most significant areas are the provision of health services and 
education.  New Zealand’s twenty one district health boards (DHBs) are responsible for 
administering approximately NZ$12 billion of heath related services annually and its 
education providers also manage just over NZ$12 billion each year (New Zealand Treasury 
Department, 2009).  There are expectations that public sector entities adopt corporate 
governance principles consistent with good practice including establishing audit committees 
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(OAG, 2008).  Given these expectations and the considerable size of the public sector, audit 
committees are likely to have an important role to play in the internal control structures within 
New Zealand’s public sector.   
The importance of strong governance and internal controls within public sector entities 
has been brought to the fore recently with changes made to the governance of institutes of 
technologies and polytechnics (ITPs).  The changes are intended to allow a quicker 
response to the risks posed by ITPs with educational or financial performance issues (Tolley, 
2009). Under the Education (Polytechnics) Amendment Bill (2009), there is a new emphasis 
on achieving and maintaining good governance practices. Appointments to the ITP councils, 
which will be reduced in size, will be made on the basis of relevant skills and experience, 
especially governance experience, and fifty percent of the council members will be 
appointed by the Minister of Tertiary Education. 
The lack of strong governance and good internal controls were partly blamed for the 
largest fraud in New Zealand public sector history, which occurred at the Otago DHB in 2008 
(Peart, 2008). The Otago DHB fraud, which occurred over a six year period, was carried out 
by the former Chief Information Officer of the DHB and involved NZ$17 million.   
A review of audit committee literature suggests that the effectiveness of an audit 
committee is often influenced by the independence and financial expertise of its members 
(Bédard and Gendron, 2009). Most of the research in this area has focused on the operation 
of audit committees in the corporate sector, using an agency-theory-based approach to 
develop and test hypotheses. The objectives of public sector entities differ from those of 
profit-oriented organisations, and therefore in the absence of any principal-agent relationship 
we use a resource dependency theory framework more suited to the public sector.  
Resource dependency theory arose in the 1960s and 1970s, through the works of 
Thompson (1967); Levine and White (1973) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1973) (cited in 
Wyttenbach-Lyndsey, 2005). The underlying assumption upon which resource dependency 
theory is based is that an organisation's survival depends on its ability to acquire and 
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maintain resources. The theory assumes that organisations are not self-sufficient and are 
dependent on resources, including financial, from external sources. Pfeffer and Salancik 
(2003) suggest dependent organisations seek to alter their organisational goals and 
structures, such as boards and committees, in order to acquire necessary resources.  
Research based on resource dependency theory has shown that there is a relationship 
between external financial resource dependence and the composition and structure of 
boards of directors (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). In particular, differences in the type and 
source of financial resources lead to differences in audit committee composition in the non-
profit sector (Vermeer, Raghunandan, and Forgione, 2006).  
In this paper we hypothesise that the composition of the public sector entities’ audit 
committees will be associated with the different sources of funding. We expect that public 
sector entities that receive a higher percentage of central government funding are more 
likely to voluntarily establish audit committees that consist solely of independent members 
and include a financial expert than those public sector entities that receive a higher 
proportion of private funding. Public sector entities, like their private sector counterparts are 
often funded in part by external lenders and have a responsibility to debtholders to monitor 
compliance with debt covenant provisions. The demand for this type of monitoring would 
most likely increase as the level of debt increases. We therefore hypothesise that public 
sector entities that rely on higher levels of debt are more likely to have an audit committee 
with a majority of independent members and a financial expert.  
This study examines the audit committees of a sample of 50 PSEs comprising DHBs, 
local government councils, ITPs and universities.  We find that only 28 PSEs (56 percent) 
disclose the existence of an audit committee in their annual reports. This result is surprising 
given the emphasis by regulators on improving standards of corporate governance and the 
recent release of a number of good practice guides for audit committees.  The audit 
committees, apart from those in the ITP sector, have a majority of members that are 
independent and have at least one financial expert; except the financial experts on the 
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universities’ audit committees were not independent. The audit committees in the ITP sector 
comprised the lowest percentage of independent members, due in part to the inclusion of 
government appointed representatives on the ITP boards.  
The study also finds that PSEs that have higher levels of debt are more likely to have 
independent audit committees; however PSEs that rely on high levels of government funding 
are not more likely than other PSEs to have an audit committee with a majority of 
independent members and a financial expert. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the types of public 
sector entities in New Zealand and their different sources of funding. In Section 3 we review 
the literature on audit committee membership, with a particular focus on the public sector 
and audit committees in New Zealand. In Section 4, we state the objectives of the study and 
in Section 5 we develop the hypotheses. Section 6 describes the research design, and the 
results are presented in Section 7 and summarised and discussed in Section 8. 
 
2.0  Public sector entities in New Zealand 
There are a number of different types of public sector entities in New Zealand, 
including:  
• district health boards (DHBs), which are responsible for providing, or funding the 
provision of, health and disability services in their districts (New Zealand Ministry of 
Health, 2009); 
• universities, and institutes of technology and polytechnics (ITPs), which are 
responsible for providing tertiary education to support their local communities (New 
Zealand Ministry of Education, 2009); and 
• local government councils, which are responsible for managing the environmental, 
resource and transport planning issues for the region (Local Councils New Zealand, 
2009).  
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The amount of central government funding each public sector entity receives depends 
on the function of the entity.  For example, DHBs are entirely government funded, due to 
New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 which requires that public healthcare be 
provided free of charge to all New Zealand residents.  The amount of funding provided by 
the government to DHBs is calculated according to the population size for which each DHB 
is responsible.  
Universities and ITPs are not as dependent on government funding as DHBs but still 
rely on funding from central government to provide their educational services to the public at 
affordable prices. Tertiary institutions in New Zealand (excluding private education providers) 
receive significant funding from central government; for example, this funding represented 
48 percent of the total income received by all tertiary institutions in 2004. On average in 
2004, the university sector received 39 percent of its total income from government funding, 
while the ITP sector received around 60 percent of its revenue from central government 
funding (Russell, 2007).  
Local government councils only receive a small proportion of their income from central 
government; their main source of revenue comes from rates which are collected from the 
population, including property and local council rates (Local Councils New Zealand, 2009).  
Government funding is often in the form of grants which allows for motorways and roads to 
be built and maintained (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2009). 
 
3.0 Literature review  
3.1      Best practice guidelines for audit committees 
Audit committee best practice guidelines have been established by a number of 
organisations both internationally and within New Zealand.  Outside of New Zealand, notable 
best practice recommendations have been issued by the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) 
(1999), the Cadbury Committee (1992) and all the Big-4 accounting firms, such as 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2003).   
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Within New Zealand the Institute of Directors (IOD) issued a best practice statement 
pertaining to audit committees in 1996; this was updated in 2007 when the IOD issued a 
best practice guide for directors which includes a section on audit committees. Following the 
collapse of Enron the New Zealand stock exchange (NZX Limited) required listed companies 
to establish audit committees (rule 3.6), following the lead of the US and Australian markets 
(NZX, 2003).  In 2004 the New Zealand Securities Commission (NZSC) issued a number of 
corporate governance principles and guidelines to be applied by entities with significant 
economic impact such as publicly listed entities, which include some recommendations for 
audit committees. The guidelines recommend that audit committees have a charter which 
sets out their role and responsibilities and that the committee reports back to the board on 
these. It also recommends that the audit committee include a majority of independent 
directors, a financial expert and a chairperson who is not the board chair (NZSC, 2004).   
In the New Zealand public sector, there are no specific regulatory or legislative 
requirements for establishing audit committees.  There are pieces of public sector legislation 
(such as the Public Finance Act 1989, Crown Entities Act 2004, and Local Government Act 
2002) which require public entities to maintain a “system of internal control designed to 
provide reasonable assurance as to the integrity and reliability of financial reporting” (Crown 
Entities Act 2004, s21).  However, the legislation stops short of defining ‘internal control’.   
Most recently the New Zealand Office of the Auditor-General (OAG) issued a good 
practice guide for audit committees in the public sector (2008), which is of particular interest 
in this study.  The “Audit Committees Public Sector Good Practice Guide” (2008) outlines 
the recommended composition of audit committees which includes the use of independent 
members. Where possible audit committees should exclude employees and government 
appointed board members. The Guide also recommends the inclusion of a financial expert 
on audit committees such as a chartered accountant or similar, with experience in public 
sector financial reporting, and suggests that the audit committee should have between three 
and five members (OAG, 2008).  For PSEs that decide not to form audit committees the 
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Auditor-General expects the governing body or the chief executive to put into place 
appropriate systems and processes to ensure that they can carry out their accountability 
and governance responsibilities (OAG, 2008).  
 
3.2    Audit committee composition  
There have been numerous studies on the composition of corporate sector audit 
committees.  In a review of 103 studies Bédard and Gendron (2009) found that research has 
often (but not always) indicated that audit committee independence is positively associated 
with the effectiveness of the committee.  Similarly the competence of audit committee 
members, including their financial and governance expertise, is usually associated with the 
effectiveness of the committee.  However, this research is dominated by studies of listed 
companies in the United Studies.  There is scarce evidence, however, about the composition 
or operation of the audit committees of non-profit entities1
 A study of non-profit audit committees in the US in 2006 by Vermeer et al. (2006) 
found that 64 percent of the respondents that had formed audit committees had members 
who were completely independent and 56 percent had at least one member with financial 
expertise. Surprisingly, the findings from the study suggest that hospitals and universities are 
less likely than other non-profit entities to have audit committees consisting solely of 
independent directors.  In further analysis it was found that organisations that were larger, 
that received government funding grants, and that used a Big-4 auditor were more likely to 
have audit committees consisting solely of independent directors. Expertise found on non-
profit audit committees was found to increase with the amount of government funding they 
receive. “Eighty-eight percent of non-profits have at least one financial expert on the audit 
committee, and organizations that receive government grants and have an internal audit 
.  
                                                             
1 Non-profit entities are equivalent to public benefit entities in New Zealand, which include public 
sector entities, clubs and charities, “whose primary objective is to provide goods and services for 
community or social benefit” (NZICA, 2009, p.55). 
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function are more likely to have a financial expert on the committee” (Vermeer et al., 2006, 
p.75). 
Very little research has been carried out on the composition or operation of audit 
committees that have been formed by public sector entities in New Zealand. Porter and 
Gendall (1998) examined audit committees in both the public and the private sectors in the 
early 1990s, and found that 70 percent of audit committees in the public sector and 60 
percent in the private sector had CEOs as a member of the audit committee.  Respondents 
in this study reported that an understanding of the audit committee purpose and ability to 
exercise sound judgment were the most important attributes of audit committee membership, 
ahead of independence and financial expertise.  A more recent study by Goodwin (2003) of 
public and private sector audit committees in Australia and New Zealand found that public 
sector audit committees tend to be less independent and have fewer members with 
accounting expertise than those in the private sector in both countries.   
The New Zealand Institute of Internal Auditors (NZIIA) and Big-4 firm KPMG 
conducted a survey of audit committee practices across ministries and government 
departments in 2005.  The study found that audit committees were a relatively new 
phenomenon in the New Zealand public sector, with 18 departments of the 24 respondents 
(75 percent) having voluntarily established audit committees (42 departments in total).  New 
Zealand public sector chief executives had much more control over their audit committees 
than their counterparts overseas with audit committees chaired by the chief executive in 55 
percent of the cases.  The committees lacked independence with only two audit committees 
(11 percent) having a majority of members drawn from outside the organisation.  The public 
sector audit committees were found to be typically bigger than their overseas counterparts, 
with a membership of six to eight, usually including the senior management team. This 
contrasted with public sector audit committees overseas where three to five audit committee 
members was normal, with senior management being observers (NZIIA and KPMG, 2005).  
This finding was similar to Goodwin’s 2003 study in which she found that public sector audit 
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committees tend to be larger than those in the private sector in both Australia and New 
Zealand. 
More recently, a case study of the operations of an audit committee of a DHB in New 
Zealand by Magrane and Malthus (2009) found that the audit committee, which the DHB had 
voluntarily established, comprised four non-executive board members plus an ‘ex officio’ 
chair, who was appointed by the Minister of Health. The chair of the audit committee of this 
DHB was the only member with financial expertise, while the other members, who had been 
democratically voted onto the board of the DHB, had backgrounds primarily in the health 
sector.  
 
4.0 Research objective 
The purpose of the current study is to investigate the existence and composition of 
audit committees for three different types of public sector entities in New Zealand, namely 
DHBs, local councils, and universities and ITPs.  Our first goal is to investigate if the audit 
committees of the selected public sector entities have the attributes for an effective audit 
committee, as recommended by the OAG best practice guide for audit committees (2008).  
We then use the resource dependency framework to test whether there is any association 
between the source of funding received by the PSEs and the composition of audit committee.  
Finally we test whether PSEs that have higher levels of debt are more likely to have 
independent audit committees. 
 
5.0  Hypotheses  
Applying resource dependency theory to audit committees suggests that differences 
in the nature and types of funding will lead to difference in the demand for monitoring and for 
that reason differences in the composition of audit committees (Vermeer et al., 2006). The 
following hypotheses have therefore been developed: 
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Government funding  
Public sector entities with greater reliance on government funding/grants, such as 
DHBs, would be expected to be under greater scrutiny by government as they would have to 
be accountable to the respective Minister to justify the use of the resources provided.  The 
demand for financial monitoring would therefore be higher and the audit committee would 
more likely be structured in a way to be an effective monitoring mechanism.  It is 
hypothesised that: 
 
H1 Public sector entities that rely on higher levels of government funding are more likely to 
have an audit committee with a majority of independent members and a financial expert.  
 
Debt  
Agency theory suggests that with the use of debt there are potential conflicts between 
shareholders and debtholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  While shareholder and 
debtholder conflicts are not relevant to the public sector there can still exist conflicts 
between external funders, for example rate payers, and creditors. In addition the borrower 
may have certain covenants to meet and therefore public sector entities have a 
responsibility to debtholders to monitor compliance with debt covenant provisions. The 
demand for this type of monitoring, including the formation of an effective audit committee, 
would most likely increase as the level of debt increases. It is hypothesised that: 
 
H2  Public sector entities that rely on higher levels of debt are more likely to have an audit 
committee with a majority of independent members and a financial expert.  
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6.0 Research design 
6.1 Model and variables  
A regression model is used to test the relation between the nature of funding of the 
public sector entities and the composition of their audit committees.  The model is specified 
as follows:  
ACi  = β0 + β1GOVTi + β2LEVi  + β3LSIZEi + β4BSIZEi + β5BRDINDi + e  
 
The dependent variable ACi is a proxy for audit committee attributes.  The first 
attribute is audit independence (ACIND) which is the percentage of independent audit 
committee members. For classification purposes an independent audit committee member is 
defined as a member not employed by the PSE and not appointed by the government. The 
second attribute measured was financial expertise (ACEXP). The variable is the percentage 
of financial experts on the audit committee. We classify audit committee members qualified 
as Chartered Accountants (CA) to be financial experts2
The independent variables include the amount of government funding (GOVT) defined 
as the government revenue as a proportion of total revenue.  Funding from creditors (LEV) 
is defined as the proportion of total liabilities to total assets  
.  Annual report disclosures are used 
to identify independent and financially expert audit committee members.  
The model includes variables controlling for factors from prior research that are 
associated with the composition of audit committees in the private sector in New Zealand 
and are relevant to the public sector (Rainsbury, Bradbury and Cahan, 2008).  Firm size 
(LSIZE) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Board size (BDSIZE) is the number of 
individuals serving on the board of directors and board independence (BDIND) is the 
percentage of independent directors.  
 
 
                                                             
2 Data on independent financial experts was not available at this time.  
 13 
6.2  Population and data 
The population comprises DHBs, local government councils, and universities and ITPs 
in New Zealand, from which a random sample of 50 PSEs was selected.  A stratified 
sampling approach was applied. Table 1 summaries the three groups of PSEs in the 
population and the sample selected for the study. 
Insert Table 1 
 
7.0 Results and analysis 
7.1 Audit committees: descriptive data 
Table 2 shows that all the DHBs and the universities in the sample have established 
audit committees; however, only 14 of the 32 councils (44 percent) and three of the seven 
ITPs (43 percent) have audit committee, as disclosed in their annual reports.  Fourteen of 
the 32 councils (44 percent) have no formal audit committee, although some stated that 
audit committees could be established if required.  Five councils mentioned the existence of 
a finance committee which included some of the responsibilities of an audit committee; 
however no details regarding size or membership were disclosed.  Eight PSEs made no 
disclosures about audit committee details, of these four were councils and four were ITPs, 
and it is assumed that these PSEs have not formed an audit committee.   
Overall, therefore only 56 percent of the PSEs sampled have established an audit 
committee, which is relatively low when compared to the proportion of government 
departments in New Zealand who have voluntarily established audit committees. Of those 
government departments who responded to a questionnaire from KPMG and NZIIA in 2005, 
75 percent had voluntarily established audit committees, and this percentage may have 
increased since the date of the study. 
Insert Table 2 
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Board size and composition 
The size of the PSE boards ranged from 7 to 20 board members; the university boards 
were the largest with an average size of 18 members and the DHBs had the smallest boards 
with an average of 11 board members.  
Board independence for each of the PSEs was also assessed. In this study an 
independent board member is defined as a member not employed by the PSE and not 
appointed by the government. Based on this definition, councils were 100 percent 
independent with all councillors publicly elected.  DHBs, ITPs and universities all had four 
government appointed directors as required by legislation which reduced the level of board 
independence.  Universities had on average 78 percent of independent board members, 
followed by the ITPs with 73 percent and DHBs with the lowest average board independence 
of 64 percent. Table 3 summarises the average size of the board for each type of PSE, and 
the proportion of independent board members.   
Insert Table 3  
 
Audit committee size and independence  
Table 4 shows that the number of audit committee members ranged from three to 
nine members, with an average overall size of 5.63. This is higher than the three to five audit 
committee members recommended by the OAG guide.  The smaller recommended size is 
intended to ensure that all members on the committee have a voice and are able to 
participate fully in proceedings of the audit committee (OAG, 2008). DHB audit committees 
were the largest with an average of 5.88 members. 
Independent audit committee members are important to ensure that they can carry 
out their governance role without undue influence from management; and the OAG good 
practice guide recommends that most of an audit committee’s members be independent of 
the management team (OAG, 2008). On average, 75.81 percent of audit committee 
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members were independent from management, suggesting that the good practice guidelines 
were generally being met.  
Local council audit committee members were all independent from management; 
however the number of independent members on the DHB audit committees was just over 
the recommended minimum of 50 percent.  The members of the ITP audit committees were 
the least independent, with an average of only 25 percent, due to the inclusion of staff and 
government-appointed officials on the boards.  This may reflect the increased financial 
scrutiny of this sector by the government (Tolley, 2009). 
DHBs and ITPs were the only PSEs which included government appointed ministers 
on their audit committees. DHB audit committees had the highest average of government 
appointed members on their audit committees, with an average of 50 percent of committee 
members representing the government. ITPs and universities were the only PSEs that 
included employees as audit committee members.   
Insert Table 4 
 
Expertise of audit committee members 
The OAG guide recommends that PSE audit committee members possess a 
combination of expertise, including experience in financial reporting, governance, and an 
understanding of internal and external audit.  For the purpose of this study a financial expert 
was considered to be a Chartered Accountant or a qualified accountant with a history of 
preparing financial reports for PSEs. The results from Table 5 show that overall there was an 
average of one financial expert on the audit committees, and with the exception of the 
universities in the sample the financial experts were all independent from the PSE 
management. 
Insert Table 5 
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The backgrounds of audit committee members varied depending on the type of PSE.  
DHBs had a high proportion of medical experts on their audit committees; universities had a 
number of members from educational backgrounds, while local councils had members with a 
range of business and management skills on their audit committees. The ITPs sampled did 
not publish the backgrounds of their audit committee members. Although not a requirement, 
the OAG good practice guide suggests that the inclusion of a lawyer on PSE audit 
committees is advantageous (OAG, 2008).  The majority of the audit committees of the local 
councils (64 percent) had at least one lawyer on their committees; however most of the other 
audit committees in the sample did not include a lawyer. 
 
7.2  Regression results 
Table 6 reports the regression results for audit independence.  We do not include the 
control variable for firm size as there is a high correlation between firm size and board size 
(r=0.58). The model is significant and has high explanatory power (adjusted R square is 78.8 
percent). Focusing on the two funding variables; GOVT is not significant while LEV is weakly 
significant (p=0.07). This evidence provides weak support for hypothesis 2, which is 
consistent with evidence for private sector entities (Rainsbury et al., 2008). 
However, the results show no support for hypothesis 1 as there is no significant 
association between the level of government funding and the composition of audit 
committees. This result for GOVT is no doubt due to the high proportion of local councils in 
the sample (63 percent of the sample) which do not rely on government funding. This finding 
is inconsistent with the results of prior research such as Vermeer et al. (2006) which found 
that non-profit organisations that receive government grants are more likely to have audit 
committees with solely independent directors and have a financial expert on the audit 
committee. However, it should be noted that Vermeer et al.’s study was carried out in the US 
and included charities i.e. it was not restricted to public sector entities only, which may 
account for the different findings. 
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Surprisingly board size is negatively and significantly related to audit committee 
independence suggesting that large boards are less likely to create audit committees with a 
majority of independent members. This result is inconsistent with similar studies of audit 
committees in the for-profit sector (Rainsbury et al., 2008). Consistent with prior research 
board independence is positively related to having independent audit committees. 
The regression was repeated for audit committee financial expertise. The results (not 
documented) show audit committee expertise only associated with the size of the entity.  
Insert Table 6 
 
8.0 Summary and conclusions 
Audit committees are a vital monitoring mechanism for public sector entities.  They help 
to ensure that transparency and accountability are achieved and they help to ensure that 
entities act in the best interest of their stakeholders. This study explores the composition of 
audit committees and tests if their composition is associated with how the entities are funded. 
 Only 28 of the sample of 50 PSEs (56 percent) published details regarding the 
existence and composition of their audit committees in their annual reports, which compares 
adversely to the 75 percent of government departments in 2005 (KPMG and NZIIA, 2005). 
This is a surprisingly low percentage considering the emphasis placed on good governance 
practices since the early 2000s.   
The average size of the PSE audit committees in the study was larger than that 
recommended in the OAG best practice guide; and is similar to the findings of the KPMG and 
NZIIA study in 2005. This is due in part to the inclusion of the management team and/or 
government appointed representatives on some of the audit committees. The relatively large 
size of the audit committees may limit their effectiveness if all members are unable to have a 
voice on the committee; however research such as Magrane and Malthus (2009) suggests 
that the most important attribute of an audit committee is the financial expertise of its 
members.  
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The OAG best practice guide recommends that the audit committee possess a 
combination of expertise, including experience in financial reporting, governance, and an 
understanding of internal and external audit. All of the 32 PSEs with audit committees, 
except for one local council, have at least one member with financial expertise; hence it 
would appear that this recommendation is generally being followed. 
Of concern was the lack of independence of audit committee members. The DHBs and 
the ITPs had the lowest percentage of independent members, as a result of the high number 
of government appointed representatives as distinct from elected members on the audit 
committees.  
Finally, the study finds that public sector entities that have higher levels of debt are 
more likely to have independent audit committees; however PSEs that rely on high levels of 
government funding i.e. DHBs, are not more likely than other PSEs to have an audit 
committee with a majority of independent members and a financial expert. 
This study is limited to the examination of the audit committees of 50 PSEs, 
representing only 37 percent of the total number of DHBs, local councils, and universities 
and ITPs in New Zealand. It is the intention of the authors to extend this study to include 
audit committees in other public sector entities, such as government departments, so that a 
comprehensive study of the existence and composition of audit committees in the public 
sector of New Zealand can be undertaken and conclusions based on the complete 
population can be drawn. 
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Tables 
Table 1 Population and Sample 
 Population Sample 
 # % # % 
Local Government Councils (Councils) 85 63 32 64 
District Health Boards (DHBs) 21 16 8 16 
Institutes of Technology and Polytechnics (ITPs) 20 15 7 14 
Universities (Unis) 8 6 3 6 
 134 100 50 100 
 
Table 2 Audit Committee Existence 
 Councils DHBs ITPs Unis Total 
 # % # % # % # % # % 
Audit committee 
established 14 44 8 100 3 43 3 100 28 56 
Audit committee 
not established   14 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 28 
No data available 4 12 0 0 4 57 0 0 8 16 
 32 100 8 100 7 100 3 100 50 100 
           
 
Table 3 Board Size and Independence 
 Means by PBE Overall 
 Councils  DHBs ITPs Unis Mean  Std Dev Max  Min 
Board size 12.63 11 14.86 18 13 2.89 20 7 
Number of Government 
appointed directors 
members  
0 4 4 4 1.44 1.94 4 0 
Number of independent 
directors   12.63 7 10.86 14 11.56 3.19 20 7 
Percentage of independent 
directors  100% 64% 73% 78% 89%    
         
 
Table 4 Audit Committee Size and Independence 
 Means by PBE Overall 
 Councils  DHBs ITPs Unis Mean  Std Dev Max  Min 
Audit committee size 5.71 5.88 4.5 5.33 5.63 1.31 9 3 
Number of PBE employees 0 0 2.5 2 0.41 0.93 3 0 
Number of government 
appointed directors   0 3 0.5 0 0.93 1.44 4 0 
Number of independent 
directors   5.71 3 1.5 3.33 4.33 1.96 9 0 
Percentage of independent 
directors  100% 50.88% 25% 63.33% 75.81% 28.80 100% 25% 
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Table 5 Audit Committee Financial Expertise 
 Means by PBE Overall 
 Councils  DHBs ITPs Unis Mean  Max  Min 
Audit committee size 5.71 5.88 4.5 5.33 5.63 9 3 
Number of financial experts  0.86 1.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 2 0 
Percentage of independent 
financial experts  100% 50.88% 25% 63.33% 75.81% 100% 25% 
 
Table 6 Regression Results  
 Audit Committee Independence 
 Coefficient  p-value 
Constant 0.599 0.135 
GOVT -0.186 0.644 
LEV 0.596 0.052 
DHB -0.224 0.379 
LSIZE 0.041 0.250 
BDSIZE -0.113 0.008 
BDIND 0.097 0.042 
   
Fstatistic 16.964 0.000 
Adjusted R 
Square  0.787  
 
 
 
 
